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Frustrated Belligerence
The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian
Division in the First World War
William Stewart
It [5th Division] embodied the patriotism, the hopes, the ambitions and the concentrated effort of more than
eighteen thousand Canadian citizens in the full vigor of their physical and intellectual manhood … yet it was
destroyed and broken in an official letter covering one typewritten sheet.
“Canada’s Fifth Division: A History”1
The Fifth Division was one of the liabilities the Union Government took over. It was a mistake from the start.
Toronto Star, March 19182

D

uring the First World War, the
5th Canadian Division fought
no battles, won no honours, and
earned no glory. Histories of the war
accord it no more than the briefest of
mentions, and even then its status
is often misrepresented. It is a case
study on the salient influence of
political expediency and the limits
on the Canadian conduct of the war.
Coveted by the British, but regarded
with ambivalence by its Canadian
political and military superiors,
the division’s course and fate were
powerfully influenced by the three
intertwined factors of politics,
manpower availability, and British
demands for another fighting division
at the front. Political expediency led
to its formation, the appointment of
its commander, its continued survival
in the face of Canadian manpower
shortages, and finally to its eventual
disbandment. Recruitment problems
crucially impacted the division, as
the Canadian political authorities
tried to strike a balance between their
desire to satisfy the British demands
for a fifth Canadian division on the
Western Front and the ability to
maintain the four existing divisions

Abstract: The 5th Division’s inception,
career, and eventual fate in the
First World War were powerfully
conditioned by Canadian political
imperatives, manpower availability,
and tension between the Canadian
authorities’ desire to satisfy British
demands for another division and
recognition of manpower shortages.
Activated in part to ensure a divisional
command for the son of Sam Hughes,
it was disbanded once the threat
of Hughes and other political
necessities had receded. Its welltrained personnel were a valuable
addition to the Canadian Corps, when
replacements were at a premium.
The unhappy career of the division
illustrates how political expediency
powerfully influenced decisionmaking, but also the limits of senior
Canadian politicians and officers
willingness to satisfy domestic and
imperial political demands.

on active service. The British high
command was keen to add another
superb Canadian division at the front,
and it was relentless in pressuring
Canadian authorities for it. The
aim of this article is to describe
and analyze the history of the 5th
Division through the lens of three
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factors listed above. The paper
examines the circumstances of the
division’s formation, the selection of
its commander, the rationale for its
continued existence, struggles with
the British regarding its status, and
the division’s fate.

Dawn

I

n the summer of 1916, Sir Sam
Hughes, the minister of militia
and defence, believed Canada could
raise more divisions than the four it
had already fielded. Hughes was the
dominant figure in the 5th Division’s
formation and development. The
mercurial Hughes, aged 63, was
a self-made man from Lindsay,
Ontario, whom Sir Robert Borden, the
Canadian prime minister, appointed
to the Militia and Defence portfolio
in 1911. Hughes was pugnacious,
partisan, grandiose, frenetic, and
unfettered by self-doubt. He was
supremely confident in his judgment
of people and situations. 3 This
attitude contributed to Hughes’
desire for personal control over “his
boys.” He established a confused
and overlapping set of authorities
31
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more than four divisions would
be in the firing line at a time,
so no additional troops would
be exposed to enemy fire, and,
therefore, would not increase the
replacement burden. This plan,
however, required the British
to agree to the restricted usage
of the additional divisions – a
restriction they neither would
nor could accept, as military
exigencies might demand that
all the divisions be committed
to the line. Borden would later
use a variant of this approach to
demonstrate to the British that
he was willing to send the 5th
Division to the front, but with
unacceptable conditions.
While not officially
authorized, the planning
for the formation of the 5th
Division proceeded during the
fall of 1916 as the Canadian
authorities in England struggled
The pugnacious Major-General Sir Sam Hughes,
minister of militia and defence from 1911-1916,
to gather the specialists and
was the dominant figure in the formation and
equipment needed for a full
development of the 5th Division.
division, while trying to satisfy
the replacement demands of the
Canadian Corps.12 An active service
England to break up battalions to
provide replacements for the heavy
division required a core of 12 infantry
losses suffered by Canadian divisions
battalions, plus pioneer, medical,
on the Somme with, “Stand firm.
engineer, supply, signals, artillery,
Let our divisions rest. We will get
and headquarters units, amounting to
all six divisions in shape. Surely
about 18,000 men. These units needed
Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every
officers, NCOs, men, equipment, and
month [referring to the costly Battle
training supplies if the division was
of Mount Sorrel].”9 This order came
to embark for the continent, but all
were in short supply.
at a time when the corps had already
suffered 18,000 casualties on the
Somme, with an estimated 7,000 more
Detour
by the end of the month and only
13,000 replacements available.10
omentous changes in the
political and military structure
An unattributed document, but
of the overseas forces interrupted
which appears from internal evidence
the formation of the 5th Division.
to date from October or November
By late 1916, the administrative and
1916, suggested the means by which
training system in England was
Hughes planned to maintain six
11
clearly not functioning effectively.
divisions in the field. The document
The most obvious manifestation of
called for a force of two corps of three
this failure was the system’s inability
divisions each, with one division
to replace the losses incurred on the
per corps always out of the line to
Somme. Despite the availability of
absorb replacements and conduct
126,420 men in England in November
training. This proposal meant no
Library and Archives Canada C-020240

that reflected his desire to
centralize all decision-making
under his aegis.4 Hughes was
also a dangerous man to cross
– although a staunch friend –
he was an inveterate enemy to
those he thought wronged him
or his cause.
Discovering Australia
had five divisions in France
and two in Egypt, Hughes
believed Canada, with its
larger population, “can put at
least eight if not ten Divisions
into the field.” 5 Australia’s
male population in 1911 was
2.3 million versus Canada’s
3.8 million, suggesting that
Hughes’ notion was not entirely
far-fetched. 6 He immediately
followed by ensuring a cadre
remained in England that
could help form a fifth and
sixth division when the 4th
Canadian Division left England
for France in August 1916.
The 4th Division’s artillery
remained for further training
and could be co-opted for the
5th Division – the 4th Division in
France was supported by the British
Lahore Division’s artillery.7
In September 1916, Hughes
promised the chief of the imperial
general staff (CIGS), General Sir
William Robertson, that a fifth
division would be ready in November
and a sixth early in the New Year.8
This promise indicated Hughes was
confident he would remain in charge
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force
(CEF) and could fulfill his pledge. It
also illustrated the degree to which
Hughes was out of touch with the
declining volunteer rate in Canada,
a subject to be discussed later, and
the consequent impact on providing
replacements for the Canadian
Corps. Hughes was adamant that the
battalions intended to form the 5th
Division must not be used to supply
drafts to the divisions at the front. In
October, he responded to the request
from the Canadian authorities in

M

2

: Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War

Canadian War Museum 19920044-371

1916, there were only 3,387 trained
men to meet the need for 16,188
replacements, because men were
tied up in battalions intended for
the 5th and 6th Divisions, inefficient
manpower utilization, and inadequate
procedures for returning wounded
men to active service.13 Senior officers
in the Canadian Corps, the British,
and even Borden complained about
the disorganization and misrule.14
Borden had a terrible dilemma.
It was apparent Hughes could
not rectify the serious problems
with the overseas administration.15
Hughes, however, had a powerful
constituency in Canada, believing
his claims of accomplishments.16
Borden, non-confrontational by
nature, feared the damage the
truculent Hughes could do if
ousted. Rather than asking for
Hughes’ resignation, Borden
sought to marginalize him by
establishing a separate ministry
for overseas forces to limit Hughes’
control over the CEF, whilst letting
him retain his cabinet role as the
minister of militia for forces in
Canada. Hughes refused to accept
Borden’s ploy, and eventually
his outrageous behaviour forced
Borden to demand his resignation.
After much anguish, intrigue, and
pleas, Hughes finally resigned in
November 1916.17
This afforded Borden the
opportunity to make changes. Sir
George Perley, an astute politician
and an anglophile, would head a
new ministry of Overseas Military
Forces of Canada (OMFC), and
retain his position as acting high
commissioner in London.18 The
new ministry would take over
from the militia department the
Major-General Garnet Hughes,
pictured here as a brigadier when he
commanded 1st Canadian Infantry
Brigade, did not distinguish himself
early in the war but his father’s
patronage secured him command of
5th Division.
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large, and hitherto chaotic Canadian
organization of training camps,
barracks, supply depots and other
facilities in England. The intention
was that the organization in England
should more effectively carry out it
prime responsibility for dispatching
trained reinforcements to the corps.
In Canada, Borden appointed Sir
Edward Kemp as minister of militia
in place of Hughes. Kemp had served
as a minister without portfolio at the
start of the war. He acted as Borden’s
trouble-shooter investigating
operations of various departments
and then served as the first chairman
of the War Purchasing Committee

in 1915.19 Again, the intention was
that the forces in Canada should
better support the overseas effort by
more efficiently organizing, training
and dispatching reinforcements to
England. In late 1917, Kemp would
replace Perley as the minister of
the OMFC, while Major-General
Sir Sydney Mewburn took over the
militia portfolio.
What is puzzling is that, despite
his history of petulance and penchant
for partisan attacks on political
enemies, Hughes offered only a
muted reaction to the devastating loss
of his ministry. Certainly, there were
instructions to Conservatives not to
attack Hughes unless he attacked
the government.20 Hughes’ actions,
so contrary to his modus operandi,
strongly suggest there was an
undocumented quid pro quo. Most
likely it involved Garnet Hughes
– Sam Hughes’ son – receiving
command of a division, based on
Borden’s singular, repeated, and
fervent lobbying on behalf of the
younger Hughes to be discussed
below. Borden’s campaign was a
recurring strand of politics that
influenced the course of the 5th
Division; Garnet Hughes was
indeed eventually appointed to
command the division.
Garnet Burke Hughes, was
a 33-year-old Canadian Militia
officer and civil engineer. He
graduated from Canada’s Royal
Military College – first in his
class in 1901 – passed the Militia
Staff Course, had long service in
the Militia, and was the junior
major in Arthur Currie’s 50th
Regiment in Victoria before the
war.21 Hughes, early in the war,
was the brigade-major of Richard
Turner’s 3rd Brigade in the 1st
Canadian Division, with the rank
of lieutenant-colonel, a full rank
higher than normal for such an
appointment. 22 He performed
poorly in the Battle of Second Ypres
and the British commander of the
1st Division, Lieutenant-General
33
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The Hughes family at the Front. Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, BrigadierGeneral Garnet Hughes, and Brigadier-General William St. Pierre Hughes,
Sam’s brother, August 1916.

Sir Edwin Alderson, transferred him
to the 2nd Division.23 Through his
father’s influence, Hughes received
command of the 1st Brigade in
November 1915 which he led at
Mount Sorrel and on the Somme,
where he neither distinguished nor
disgraced himself. 24 The strains
of command, however, wore him
down.25
The first opportunity for Borden
to intervene to secure Garnet a
division came when command of
the 2nd Division became available.
With the formation of the new
34
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overseas ministry, Perley appointed
Major-General Richard Turner VC,
commander of 2nd Division, to head
Canadian forces in England. Borden
was anxious that Garnet replace
Turner, but the commander of the
Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General
Sir Julian Byng, preferred MajorGeneral Henry Burstall, a Canadian
Permanent Force officer. 26 Borden
was unhappy with the selection and
argued “I have no doubt that the man
selected by Byng is much inferior
to other mentioned [Garnet].” 27
Perley, given the final authority on

promotions by Borden, respected
Byng and was determined to
minimize the appearance of political
influence.28 Perley accepted Byng’s
recommendation and thus thwarted
the prime minister.29

Doubts About a
Fifth Division

T

he new ministers, Perley and
Kemp, had serious doubts as to
the viability of a fifth division. Perley
informed Borden in early November
1916 that, despite British pressure,
it was unlikely there were sufficient
troops to maintain a fifth division.30 In
December, Perley asked Kemp for an
estimate of manpower availability for
the next six months to determine the
formation’s fate. Perley admitted to
being torn between his imperial duty
in satisfying the CIGS and keeping
the existing forces at full strength.31
Kemp’s response was Canada could
send 15,000 men every three months
for the next nine months, but that this
would be insufficient to maintain the
existing forces.32 In addition, Kemp
was adamant that the 5th Division
should not be sent to the front, and,
believing Perley was considering
acceding to the British demands,
pointedly asked Borden if “Canadian
authorities in England intend to
act independent of our advice with
regard to this matter.”33 Perley had to
write Kemp a soothing letter making
it clear that while the formation of the
division was to proceed, it was not
deploying to France.34

Decision

U

nexpectedly, in late December,
Perley gave Turner permission
to proceed with the division’s
t e n t a t i v e a c t i v a t i o n . 35 T u r n e r
hurriedly inspected the infantry
battalions at Witley to select which
would join the division. Turner must
not have been satisfied, as he ordered
one battalion (156th Battalion) that
had already been broken up to
4

be reformed, the 104th PEI and
105th New Brunswick Battalions
to be amalgamated, and another
transferred to the division from
Bramshott camp (160th Battalion).36
Turner had to strike a balance
between the military effectiveness of
the battalions available, the regional
origin of the units, and the ability to
maintain their strength. As a result,
the division initially consisted of six
battalions from Ontario, two from
Quebec, and one each from Alberta,
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick,
and Nova Scotia. Later shortages
of manpower necessitated breaking
up the two Western Canadian
and one Quebec battalions and
their replacement by three Ontario
battalions.37
Given the considerable doubts
expressed by both the ministers of
militia and OMFC, why then did
Perley authorize the formation of
the division? It was apparent that
it was unlikely ever to deploy to
France, and the costs of equipping
and maintaining the division were
considerable. The Quartermaster-
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Sir George Perley, head of the Overseas
Military Forces of Canada (OMFC)
and acting high commissioner was
caught between serving the Empire and
Canadian manpower realities.

General’s department estimated the
additional equipment and yearly
operating costs for the 5th Division’s
transportation at £245,000 or over
a million dollars over the costs for
a standard training camp. 38 The
most likely reason for the division’s
formation was political expediency
in providing a divisional command
for Garnet Hughes. Borden was once
again exceedingly anxious about
who was to command the division,
cabling Perley in late January,
“Please consult me before final
decision. This is very important.”39
Typically, Borden only intervened
in politically sensitive matters, and
he had explicitly granted Perley
complete authority over promotions,
so this interference suggests he had
a political agenda, especially as the
incumbent commander had seniority
over Hughes, as discussed below.40

5th Division Simplified Organization Chart
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Headquarters personnel of 5th Canadian Division. Major-General Garnet Hughes is seated fifth from the right.
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figure.43 Byng, in his congratulatory
note to Hughes on his appointment,
commented “When you left I thought
you anything but quite fit and that
you really wanted a proper rest.”44
The 5th Division’s war diary recorded

Hughes’ appointment on 10 February,
and he took over the division three
days later.45 On learning of Hughes’
appointment from Perley, Borden
cabled, “Quite approve of proposed
appointment.”46
Hughes was junior to
the incumbent divisional
commander, Brigadier-General
R.G.E. Leckie, and this provides
further evidence that Hughes’
appointment was politically
motivated. Leckie’s promotion
to command of a brigade at
the front predated Garnet’s,
and Leckie had been the chief
of the general staff on the
elder Hughes’ Acting SubMilitia Council, until relieved
by Turner in December 1916.
Leckie would have been an
Library and Archives Canada PA-008006

Shortly after Perley’s decision
to activate the division in early
January, Turner asked Hughes,
still commanding the 1st Brigade,
if he would accept command with
the stipulation that the division
might not proceed overseas,
at least until the replacement
situation improved.41 Hughes
replied on 20 January,
accepting the appointment
and seeking Turner’s support,
and hoping his acceptance
would not preclude him from
the opportunity to command
a division at the front. 42 The
Canadian Representative to the
British General Headquarters
in France, Lieutenant-Colonel
Manley Sims, formally offered
the division to Hughes, on 3
February. Hughes accepted
with the information from Sims
that Canadian authorities did
not intend to send the division
to France. Sims informed Turner
that Hughes was not in good
health and should be recalled
immediately – photographs
of Hughes, as commander of
1st Brigade, show a haggard

Lieutenant-General Sir Richard
E.W. Turner, VC, general officer
commanding the Canadian Forces
in the British Isles and later chief
of the general staff of the OMFC,
was the man who had to provide
replacements for the losses
suffered by Canadian units on the
Western Front.
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understandable appointment given
his experience, seniority, and the
need to find him a substantive post
in England commensurate with his
rank. His relief was “a complete
surprise” to Leckie, and he was
incensed that a third officer junior
to him had received a division – the
other two being Major-General David
Watson (4th Division), and MajorGeneral H. Burstall (2nd Division).
Leckie demanded another command
at the front or at least a promotion to
major-general to antedate Garnet’s
promotion in recognition of his being
superseded. Perley had no position to
offer Leckie in England; the Canadian
Corps did not want him, so Perley
had to inveigle Kemp in Canada to
find Leckie a suitable position and
promotion.47

Decline in Recruiting

T

he second factor influencing the
fate of the 5th Division was the
Borden government’s mishandling
of the manpower situation leading
to shortfalls in replacements. Lacking
an appreciation of manpower needs
and resources, the government
did not recognize the decline in
volunteers in 1916, in part because the
large number of battalions moving
overseas masked the situation. 48
Many of these battalions, however,
had not been able to recruit to
full strength; there were severe
difficulties finding volunteers for
service, especially in Quebec and the
Maritimes. According to a June 1916
report from the Special Committee
on Recruiting, while Ontario had
reached 75 percent of its quota of
recruits, the Western provinces 114
percent, the Maritimes were only
at 48 percent and Quebec at 25
percent, and the Quebec total was
predominantly English-speaking.
The same report indicated only three
percent of French-speaking men
enlisted while the equivalent totals
for Canadian-born anglophones
were 13 percent and UK born were
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

Replacements Received and Dispatched
January 1917 to January 191852
Received From Canada

Drafts To France

Differential

January 1917

3,819

3,241

578

February 1917

3,487

4,527

(1,040)

March 1917

9,769

5,858

3,911

April 1917

15,197

9,342

5,855

May 1917

10,176

13,710

(3,534)

June 1917

5,317

6,242

(925)

July 1917

261

2,766

(2,505)

August 1917

2,261

4,936

(2,675)

September 1917

2,057

8,871

(6,814)

October 1917

3,160

5,584

(2,424)

November 1917

5,057

12,151

(7,094)

December 1917

3,157

3,755

(598)

January 1918

1,446

3,801

(2,355)

65,164

84,784

(19,620)

Total

60 percent.49 The British born was
high as a result of the recent influx
of immigrants from the UK just prior
to the war.
Major-General Willoughby
Gwatkin, chief of the general staff in
Ottawa, sent Borden a memo in April
1917 setting out in detail the serious
shortfall in manpower, and pleaded
that 50,000 men be compelled to
serve. Gwatkin estimated that the
CEF needed 20,000 to 30,000 men
over the summer, but that there
were only 18,496 men in the CEF
in Canada, and most of these were
unsuitable or unavailable. Only
4,000 men were joining per month,
and some of these would be unfit
for active service.50 The result of this
was a collapse in the number of men
arriving in England from Canada.
The chart below illustrates how the
numbers sent overseas declined from
a peak of 15,197 in April 1917 to a low
of 261 in July. The March and April
peaks were the result of Canadian
authorities rushing drafts to England,
as the Admiralty could not guarantee
protection against U-Boats in the
long daylight hours of May, June

and July. 51 The chart illustrates
the challenge the OMFC faced in
finding sufficient replacements,
as it provided almost 20,000 more
men than it received from Canada.
Combing-out units in England and
returning wounded men made up
the difference.

Demands by the British

T

he final factor that shaped
the story of the 5th Division
was demands by the British for its
early dispatch to the front. In early
November 1916, shortly after Perley
took over as minister of the OMFC,
he met Robertson, who made a
strong plea to deploy the 5th Division
to France, but Perley resisted. He
explained the Canadian manpower
situation to Robertson and argued
that it was unlikely that five divisions
could be sufficiently reinforced.
He obtained Robertson’s grudging
agreement that it was wiser to
maintain four full-strength divisions
in France than five understrength.53
Nevertheless, the deputy CIGS wrote
Perley on 17 November 1916 pressing
37
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for more details on progress
the 5th Division would be
with appointing command and
a source of replacements if
staff personnel for the division
necessary, potentially delaying
and reiterating Robertson’s
its readiness, and agreement
54
interest in the division. Perley
that Canada could not raise
another divisional artillery
pushed back in his reply and
formation.63 The British wanted
asked for time to build up his
organization before he could
the 5th Division to be used as
55
give a definitive answer.
replacement source only if there
were no trained replacements
The British, recognizing
available. In addition, as the 5th
Perley’s reluctance to make a
Division was a home defence
commitment, responded with
unit, it required dedicated
“Sir William Robertson hopes
artillery. 64 Field Marshal Sir
you will agree to forming a
division at Witley as soon as
Douglas Haig’s decision as the
possible, for training purposes,
commander in chief of the British
without prejudice to the question
Expeditionary Force (BEF) to
of its subsequently being sent
reorganize divisional artillery
overseas.”56 This would become
solved the artillery problem,
by reducing the number of
a standard British negotiating
field artillery brigades per
tactic, in the face of Canadian
division. His proposals freed
intransigence, to move the
up sufficient guns to form a new
Canadians closer to the position
4th Division artillery in France
sought by the British.
and permanently assign the 4th
This Canadian reluctance
Division artillery in England to
may have contributed to
On the hunt for more Canadians – General
Sir William Robertson, British chief of
the 5th Division.65
Robertson’s subsequent advice
the imperial general staff, talking to a
to the new British Prime
Keen for a fifth Canadian
Canadian
officer
in
March
1918.
Minister David Lloyd George to
division, Haig drove Robertson’s
prod the Dominions to increase
demands. In early January, he
recruitment. This resulted in an
England. 60 Undeterred, Robertson
wanted to know from Robertson
appeal from Lloyd George to the
when it would be ready to deploy,
sent a handwritten note in reply four
Dominions requesting more men in
as he was counting on it in his
days later reiterating the necessity of
December 1916.57 The British believed
plans for 1917, including the Arras
sending the division to the front.61
offensive and an expected attack in
Canada could contribute more, as, at
To reach a decision, Robertson, the
Flanders. Robertson had to inform
the beginning of 1917, the British had
deputy CIGS, and the secretary of
Haig there was “no definite decision”
already imposed conscription and
state for war Lord Derby met with
on deploying the division.66 Haig,
had 17.2 percent of its men in uniform
Perley and Turner. Not surprisingly
while only 9.6 percent of Canadian
given the British enthusiasm for the
seemingly oblivious of the doubtful
men served.58
division and Canadian ambivalence,
status of the division, continued all
the two sides left with a different
through 1917 to assume it would
The British doggedly persisted
understanding of the meeting’s
reach him. As late as mid-January
and Robertson wrote to Perley
decisions. Both parties agreed that
1918, he still counted the 5th Division
again on 1 January 1917 urging
there were not enough drafts in the
in his total of divisions available to
dispatch of the division to France in
59
pipeline to maintain a fifth division
him to commit to the line in France.67
February. This was an impossibly
in the field. Despite this, the British
short lead-time, even if the Canadian
In February 1917, unable to
believed the 5th Division was to be
authorities been in favour of sending
get commitment from Canadian
manned as soon as possible with “A”
the division. Perley stalled, asked
authorities in England, the British
category men - soldiers fit to serve on
for yet more time to gather data
High Command sent a formal plea
active duty – and the 4th Division’s
on the reinforcement situation
through the Colonial Office to
artillery was to remain with the
and to speak with Turner, a task
the governor-general of Canada
5th Division until replacement
complicated by the fact that Turner
requesting more troops and
62
units arrived from Canada.
was implementing significant reforms
specifically the 5th Division. Perley
in the Canadian administration in
advised the secretary of state for the
Perley wanted it understood that
38
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cover expected losses from the spring
offensive in which the Canadian
Corps was to participate, so the
British analysis was flawed.
The War Office asked for a
definitive answer to their earlier
requests at the end of February.
Perley’s deputy minister, Walter
Gow, replied on 2 March politely
but firmly telling the British they
could not meet their demands. Gow
referred to the conference in January
and said that nothing significant had
changed the conference’s decisions.
Gow reiterated the standard
Canadian position that upcoming
operations would place a severe
strain on the replacement system,
thus making it impossible to support
five divisions, and it was thus not
advisable to send the division to
France. 71 The Canadians adopted
a consistent position, asserting it
was better to maintain four fullstrength divisions than five weak
ones and that Canadian resources
were inadequate. Subsequent events

were to vindicate this strategy as the
casualties at Vimy Ridge and followon operations stressed the Canadian
replacement system almost to the
breaking point.
During Borden’s visit to England
for the Imperial War Conference
early in 1917, he and Perley met with
Long who, again, made a plea for the
5th Division‘s commitment. Borden
was willing to consider sending the
division if the British could guarantee
that only four divisions would be in
the line at a time, harking back to
the earlier proposal. Long could not
possibly guarantee this, as Borden
likely knew.72 There was one final
attempt at a meeting of the Imperial
War Cabinet on 30 March, where
Borden evaded the issue when
Robertson queried him about the
division’s availability.73 The British
were hoping to confront Borden
and force a commitment in front
of his peers, but Borden was too
shrewd a politician to allow this to
happen. In mid-March, as a possible
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colonies, Walter Long, not to mention
the 5th Division in the cable, and
warned there would be consequences
if the request became public.68 Perley
was most likely concerned that such
overt British pressure would have
negative political consequences
and affect recruiting. The British
approach failed.
Also in February, the War Office,
based on instructions from the British
War Cabinet, asked for the “despatch
of the 5th Canadian Division to France
as soon as its training is sufficiently
advanced.”69 Three aspects of this
request are interesting: the War
Office was invoking the considerable
prestige and power of the British
cabinet in its request to apply more
pressure on the anglophile Perley;
the note included a detailed listing
of Canadian manpower resources
available in England and base depots
in France to counter Canadian claims
of insufficient replacements; and,
the division was to move, not when
its training was complete, but only
when “sufficiently advanced,”
in recognition that the Canadian
replacement numbers were unlikely
to be adequate. The British objective
was to get the division to France,
so, if the replacement situation did
further deteriorate, it would be a far
more difficult decision to disband it
in France than if it were in England. It
would, also, be an additional incentive
for Canadian authorities to ramp up
their recruiting effort or introduce
compulsory service. The British
insistence on getting the division
to France while it was still forming
perplexed Turner. 70 In penciled
comments on the letter, Turner
noted that the replacements listed
as available would be insufficient to
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden
(centre) looking uncharacteristically
determined as he stands with his
minister of militia, Major-General S.C.
Mewburn (left) and his minister of the
OMFC, Sir Edward Kemp (right), July
1918.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

39

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Canadian War Museum 19930003-263

Brigadier-General A.E. Swift (left),
commander of the 14th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, and Major-General
Garnet Hughes (right) along with two
unidentified women at the 5th Canadian
Divisional Sports Day, October 1917.

they form a division out of Canadian
Forestry and Railway troops. Turner
and Kemp refused to change the
organization of the corps, and Kemp
pointed out the short sightedness of
Wilson’s Forestry and Rail request as
it would cripple timber production
and essential railway construction.80

Division’s Development

R

compromise, Gow notified the War
Office that the 5th Division was ready
to move within England and Scotland
as necessary. This would place the
division in a more useful mobile
role in home defence. Gow was also
careful to ensure the War Office was
aware the division was incomplete.74
Nine days later, the British tested
the division with a two-day State of
Emergency, based on a purported
German invasion, which the division
passed.75
It was not until the end of May
that the British again returned to
the issue of the division – more
urgent now given the success of the
Canadian Corps in the Arras offensive
and Borden having announced a
proposed conscription act. Robertson
pointed out the satisfactory state of
reinforcements in the Canadian Corps
and that the division was needed at
the front.76 Supporting Robertson’s
position was the fact, noted in Haig’s
diary in early July, that the Canadians
were the only force in the BEF with a
surplus of replacements. All the other
contingents were under-strength.77
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Robertson, not satisfied with just a
direct appeal to Perley, also cabled
the Canadian governor-general on
the necessity of getting the division
to the front.78 Gow was finally able
to close down the British requests
with a carefully reasoned letter that
explained the Canadians rather than
having a surplus of replacements
would probably have to use the 5th
Division to keep the Canadian Corps
at full strength through 1917 with
present levels of attrition. He pointed
out that Canadian authorities had
already raided the 5th Division to
supply replacements for the front.79
In a curious coda to these
demands for the 5th Division, in June
1918, the new CIGS, General Sir Henry
Wilson, made a desperate request.
The German spring offensives had
reduced a number of British divisions
to cadre strength, and the British were
anxious to field more formations.
Wilson asked the Canadians to
replace one battalion in each of their
brigades with an American battalion,
thus freeing up forces to form a fifth
division. Alternatively he suggested

eturning to the division’s
development, the War Office
officially authorized its organization
on 18 January following the 12
January 1917 conference, with
Turner’s headquarters issuing the
Canadian order shortly afterwards.81
The division formed at Witley
Camp in Surrey, approximately 60
kilometres southwest of London. It
consisted of three infantry brigades
– the 13th, 14th and 15th. BrigadierGeneral J.F.L. Embury commanded
the 13th Brigade. Embury was
42 years old, a solicitor, and the
prewar Militia commander of the
95th Saskatchewan Rifle Regiment.
He had successfully led the 28th
(Saskatchewan) Battalion in Turner’s
2nd Division until wounded at
the Battle of Courcelette on 15
September 1916. After recovering,
he commanded the 10th Training
Brigade, which became the 13th
Brigade.82 The commander of the 14th
Brigade was Brigadier-General A.E.
Swift, who was in his late forties and
was a Permanent Force major, with
service in the South African War.
Prewar, he was the inspector of arms
and ammunition. He commanded the
2nd Battalion in the Canadian Corps
for over a year and then led the 11th
Training Brigade, which became the
14th Brigade. 83 Brigadier-General
10

Bottom right: Brigadier-General J.F.L.
Embury, former commander of the
13th Canadian Infantr y Brigade,
photographed later in 1918 as head of
the Canadian Section, GHQ.

E.C. Ashton, who would have a
long and distinguished career in
the Canadian Army, commanded
the 15th Brigade. Prewar, Ashton, a
43-year-old physician, was in charge
of a Militia artillery battery and had
passed the Militia Staff Course. He
formed the 36th Battalion and later
commanded the 9th Reserve Brigade,
and the Canadian Training Division
at Shorncliffe. He was recalled to
Canada in November 1917 to take
over as the adjutant-general, and
he later rose to chief of the general
staff in the late 1930s.84 It is difficult
to evaluate the three brigadiergenerals as they did not command
their brigades in battle, but Swift and
Embury had commanded battalions
at the front for an extended period,
so were as qualified as any in the
Canadian Corps for promotion to
brigadier-general. Turner, as GOC
2nd Division, rated Embury as the
battalion commander most qualified
for appointment as a brigade GOC in
March 1916.85 Ashton’s later ascent
to the senior post in the Canadian
Army also suggests a competent
commander.
At its activation, the division was
incomplete, and over the course of the
next month, three battalions (160th,
161st, and 199th), the divisional
signal company, brigade machine
gun companies, engineer field
companies, and division train arrived
at Witley. However, LieutenantColonel Christian Hore-Ruthven, the
British GSO 1, the chief staff officer
of the division, did not join until 27
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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Top right: Major-General E.C. Ashton,
former commander of the 15th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, as adjutant-general of
the Canadian Militia. He would rise to be
the chief of the general staff.
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February 1917. He had been GSO
2 of the 2nd Division while Turner
was the division’s commander, so
his selection was likely a result of
him being a known quantity. HoreRuthven was a decorated veteran
of the South African war and was
wounded during 1914. Recognizing
the necessity for front line experience
in the division, Hughes recruited
staff and commanders from the
Canadian Corps. His familiarity
with officers in the 1st Division led
him to poach predominantly from
the division. Currie, exasperated at
the number of officers he was losing,
told Hughes in May that the division
was off-limits to further transfers, an
understandable reaction.86
The battalions selected to make
up the division were far from ready
for active service, despite the troops
being embodied for over a year on
average.87 An early February 1917
assessment of the division’s infantry
units indicated a desperate need
for trained drafts, instructors and
new leadership.88 The training cycle
consisted of ten weeks individual
instruction before December 1916
and 14 weeks thereafter, followed
by company preparation, company
marches, battalion exercises, brigade
training, brigade marches and finally
division exercises.89 As nine of the
12 battalions arrived in England
before October 1916, they should
have completed the battalion level
preparation as they had three full
months preparation time in England.
By February, however, only four were
ready for company training with the
remainder needing to complete
individual training and receive drafts
and instructors. Turner’s order that
eight of the battalions provide trained
replacements to the Canadian Corps
further impeded progress. As a
result, six of the eight battalions were
under-strength, and the other two
consisted of untrained drafts, which
crippled their readiness.90
Poor leadership at the battalion
level also hampered the division’s
41
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training. Few officers and NCOs
had any front experience, and so
were inadequately prepared to
instruct their men. Hughes replaced
five battalion commanders in May
and June and another left because
of illness.91 Later in January 1918,
Hughes indicated three of his
battalion commanders should be
replaced if the division crossed to
France which strongly indicates a
weak command cadre at the battalion
level.92
The division was beginning
to show progress by May 1917
regaining strength and completing
more advanced training, such that the
division started brigade exercises.93
Garnet informed Currie that three
battalions were still under-strength,
but “We are fairly well advanced
with the training” and would be
ready in five to six weeks.94

A Division in France
for Garnet?

I

n June, another opportunity
emerged to provide Garnet
Hughes with a front-line division.
Major-General Sir Arthur Currie
received command of the Canadian
Corps after Haig promoted Byng
to command Third Army. This left
an opening for Hughes to take over
Currie’s former command, the 1st
Division, and Borden wanted to
ensure Garnet received it.95 Again,
the matter of what to do with Hughes
loomed large. Manley Sims met
Currie on 10 June, and Currie claimed
Sims tried to negotiate with him
regarding the position, but Currie
rejected any interference. 96 While
Currie did not rule out offering
Hughes a division, he thought the
Permanent Force officer BrigadierGeneral A.C. Macdonell a better
choice.97 It was unlikely, however,
that Currie had any real intention
of giving Hughes a division, as
demonstrated later in 1918 when he
refused him once again. Currie later
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claimed he had to resist tremendous
pressure from the politicians to
select Hughes. Historians A.M.J.
Hyatt in his biography of Currie and
Desmond Morton in his A Peculiar
Kind of Politics both suggest he
probably exaggerated the pressure
placed on him. Hyatt also argues
Currie had a guilty conscience about
his treatment of his former friend.98
Currie later had a heated threehour meeting with Garnet who
pleaded for the opportunity to
command the 1st Division, but
Currie adamantly refused. According
to Currie, Hughes stormed out
vowing vengeance for the rejection.99
Henceforth, Currie believed Garnet
was an implacable enemy and that
Garnet and his father were sure to
try and undermine him. However,
Currie continued to correspond with
Garnet and meet with him in England
when on leave, which tends to belie
his claim and suggests he overstated
the animosity.100

Disruption in England

I

n late May, Turner had to make the
difficult decision to gut the division
for replacements for the Canadian
Corps – a serious setback to the
division’s preparations. LieutenantGeneral Sir Julian Byng, earlier in
May and still the commander of
the Canadian Corps, was unhappy
with the number of untrained men
he was receiving and suggested it
was time to use the 5th Division
as a source of trained personnel.
This must have been a factor in
Turner’s decision to use the 5th
Division for replacements. 101 The
division experienced considerable
turnover at the battalion level as the
desperate need for trained manpower
necessitated scouring the division
repeatedly for drafts and even entire
battalions to replace losses. Between
its official formation date of 23 January
and the end of May, one-quarter
of its battalions were disbanded

because of insufficient recruits.
Additionally, there was an imbalance
in battalions from regions. Based on
population, British Columbia had
four more battalions and Quebec
two more than they should have had,
while Ontario had ten fewer than its
population warranted.102 Shortfalls in
recruiting, moreover, made the 128th
(Saskatchewan), 199th (Quebec),
and 202nd (Alberta) Battalions
unsustainable, and Turner disbanded
them in May. They were replaced by
the 164th (Ontario), 198th (Ontario),
and 208th (Toronto) Battalions.
Adding to the travails of the division,
five battalions lost a total of 2,100
other ranks as replacements for the
corps in France, all but destroying
them as effective units.103
The British Inspector of Infantry’s
assessment of the division at the end
of June showed only four battalions
fit for home defence, five more
anticipated as being ready in July
and the remaining three not until
August. 104 Readiness for home
defence was a lower standard than for
overseas service, which underlined
how far the division would have to
progress to be efficient for service on
the Western Front. Hore-Ruthven,
the division’s GSO 1, was even more
pessimistic as he estimated that nine
battalions would complete battalion
training only in August and three
in September. This did not include
brigade or division exercises. In
addition, three of the battalions were
new to the division, and he rated
them as weak or only fair.105
Through June and July the division
conducted individual and battalion
level training. Then, peculiarly, at
the end of July the King inspected the
division, which was traditionally the
last act before proceeding overseas,
but, as the earlier evaluations attest,
the division was far from ready.106
At the same time, according to the
unpublished 5th Division history,
Turner queried Hughes as to when
the division would be ready to

12

: Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
proceed to France, and Hughes
thought they would be ready by the
first week of August. Apparently,
there were considerations of sending
the division over, but probably notice
of the long-planned Canadian attack
at Hill 70, finally launched 15 August
1917, and the expected casualties,
necessitated second thoughts.107 In
June, Turner believed it would be
possible to commit the 5th Division
at the beginning of August if Canada
could provide an additional 10,000
men by August and another 10,000
by October.108 In July, however, only
261 men and 2,261 in August arrived
from Canada.109 Borden at the end of
June informed Perley he wanted to
give volunteering more time before
enforcing the proposed Military
Service Act – conscription.110 This
effectively ended any possibility of
gaining the additional recruits that
Turner needed. Two days after the
King’s inspection, Lieutenant-Colonel
Hore-Ruthven transferred to take
over as the GSO 1 of the 3rd Division
in the Canadian Corps. This move
further indicated the improbability
of the Division reaching France.111
In August, instead of embarking
the full division, Perley and Turner
decided to send the 5th Division’s
artillery to France at the request of the
CIGS, along with supporting signals
and supply units.112 This was the only
formation of the division to serve
at the front. Compared to infantry,
artillery units did not have the same
casualty rate and so did not present
the same demands for replacements.
The preparations for the artillery to
move began on 7 August, with the
artillery inspected by the Duke of
Connaught, the former Canadian
governor-general, on 14 August, and
it embarked six days later.113
For the remainder of the year, the
division conducted more elaborate
and extensive brigade level exercises,
including six-day marches, trench
warfare training, and practice attacks.
In October, the engineers were
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reassigned to help build aerodromes
for the Royal Air Force, which was
another sign that the division’s future
was bleak.114

Denouement

W

hile the division trained in
England, attacks at Hill 70
in August and Passchendaele in
October and November 1917 drained
the available manpower pool, and
it became increasingly difficult to
justify the 5th Division remaining as
a home service division in England.
In late October, Borden and the
Canadian War Committee considered
if dissolution of the division was
appropriate and wanted Perley and
Turner’s views. Turner requested
an analysis by his adjutant-general,
Major-General P.E. Thacker. Without
using the 5th Division, and assuming
10,000 conscripts arrived in January,
Thacker estimated the Canadian
forces in France would still run
out of replacements by May 1918,
and this was before the outcome
of the election on conscription was
known.115 Borden again cabled Perley
stating definitively that the War
Committee had decided to break
up the division.116 Despite the dire
replacement prediction and the War
Committee decision, both Perley
and Turner agreed that the division
organization should remain intact,
but it be used to supply replacements
if needed.117 Previously, the policy
was that the division would only
supply drafts if the reserve battalions
had no replacements available.118
This provokes the question why
Perley and Turner agreed to keep
the division intact. It was most
likely political expediency related to
the December 1917 federal election
on the issue of conscription. The
prime minister had persuaded select
Liberals to join a Unionist Party slate
in favour of conscription. To help
ensure the election of the Unionist
party, Borden also enacted a number

of changes to the election act to give
the government an edge, one of
which was to allow overseas military
votes to be assigned to, essentially,
any riding the government wished.119
Military votes from the contingents
abroad were potentially critical to
the government’s success, so it was
imperative that the military vote
for the government. Australia had
run two referenda on conscription,
and both failed, in part, because of
the lack of support of the Australian
military. 120 Breaking up the 5th
Division before the election could
embitter its members and potentially
throw its votes to the Opposition.
The unpublished 5th Division history
asserts highly placed military and
government officials explicitly
promised that if Borden’s Unionist
party won the division would go to
France.121 Hughes and members of the
staff actively campaigned in favour of
the Unionist government contrary
to regulations.122 The Unionist party
won the election by a sufficient
majority, such that the military vote
switching was not necessary.
With the election success,
the division anticipated it would
soon cross to France. 123 A further
complication at this time was that the
British were reducing each infantry
brigade by one battalion because of
manpower shortages.124 The British
War Office suggested the Canadians
adopt the same organization, which
would free enough battalions to raise
a sixth division and would necessitate
a second corps. Initially, Kemp, who
had replaced Perley as minister of
the OMFC, and Turner favoured this
proposal. Currie, however, opposed it
and recommended the more efficient
and effective approach of expanding
the engineer, signals, machine gun
and transportation establishments,
and adding 100 supernumeraries
to each of the existing infantry
battalions.125 Kemp accepted the plan,
but it would require disbanding the
5th Division.
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A shortage of replacements was the ultimate reason for the disbandment of 5th Division so that its 10,000 trained could be disbursed
among the existing four divisons of the Canadian Corps. The influx of manpower was important in allowing the Canadian Corps to
maintain its combat power during the heavy fighting of the Last Hundred Days campaign.

44
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/4

14

Canadian War Museum EO-2995

: Frustrated Belligerence The Unhappy History of the 5th Canadian Division in the First World War
Conscription was enacted, but
there was to be a considerable lag
before trained conscripts arrived at
the front. Borden faced increasing
pressure to disband the division as
recovered wounded were sent back
to the line, while the under-strength
5th Division and its 10,000 trained
infantry remained in England. 126
This was pressure he found difficult
to resist. 127 Following the election
success, the need to respond to
manpower shortages outweighed
the necessity of maintaining the
shell of the 5th Division and keeping
Sam Hughes mollified through the
employment of his son as a division
commander. Kemp ordered the
division’s disbanding on 10 February
1918.128 This order was a shock to
Garnet Hughes who lamented: “After
all we had hoped and planned and
worked for it was a stunning blow
that the Division should be broken
up.”129
It was a similar blow to the
division’s officers as many of them
faced the prospect of having to
return to Canada or revert in rank
to get to France. In particular, there
was a problem of what to do with
the 120 surplus infantry captains,
majors, and lieutenant-colonels from
the disbanded battalions along with
Garnet Hughes and his brotherin-law, Byron Green, a battalion
commander in 5th Division.130 After
some initial reluctance and a plea
from Kemp, Currie agreed to accept
more surplus officers with most
having to revert only a single rank.
Any officer with experience overseas
could return to the front at their
previous rank.131
The political implications of
Garnet Hughes returning to Canada
concerned Borden. Garnet, himself,
demanded the War Office recall
the British Regular Major-General
Louis Lipsett, commander of the 3rd
Division, as a means of creating a
vacancy for him, but Kemp refused
to intervene. Currie indicated he did
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not want Hughes, ostensibly because
he had been away from the front for a
year. Hughes rejected Turner’s offer
of command of a training area, an
appointment in which Hughes could
retain his current rank.132 Eventually,
Hughes accepted an unpaid position
in the British Munitions Ministry and
Green returned to Canada, without
any backlash from Sam Hughes
towards Borden or the government.133
Contrary to the views of some
historians, the breakup of the 5th
Division did not solve the manpower
crisis but did provide a vital buffer to
supply the corps with well-trained
reinforcements while the conscripts
trained. 134 Of the 10,000 infantry
in the division, 7,200 became the
source of the 100 supernumeraries
per battalion and replacements for 50
men per infantry battalion that Currie
had drafted to bolster his machine
gun organization.135 The usual losses
in holding the line quickly used up
the remaining 2,800 men long before
the Battle of Amiens in August 1918.
The other units of the division were
sent as drafts to the Canadian Corps
or added to replacement pools in
England.

despite the unrelenting pressure
of senior British officials and the
call of empire, Perley, Kemp, and
Turner placed greater importance on
the pragmatic issues of manpower
availability and Canadian interests.
Had they not done so, the Canadian
Corps would not have had the
significant advantage of going into
battle at full strength in the crucial
offensives in the second half of 1917
and in 1918. At some point if the 5th
Division had gone to the Front, the
Canadian authorities would have had
the difficult choice of disbanding units
or even divisions, with the resulting
loss of influence, to maintain the
corps at some semblance of strength.
The unhappy history of the division
illustrates how political expediency
powerfully influenced decisionmaking, but also the limits of how
far senior Canadian politicians and
military figures were willing to satisfy
domestic and imperial political needs
in the face of manpower constraints.
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